'Perceptions of India in the West: A note on VajpayeeÆs recent visit to the United States'

There were few major issues that needed to be dealt with or resolved during Vajpayee’s visit to the U.S.

1. Lifting of sanctions

Following the nuclear tests conducted in 1998, the U.S imposed a number of sanctions against India. Federal laws that require the U.S. to discourage the spread of weapons of mass destruction necessitated some sanctions. Other sanctions were not automatic, and were imposed to "punish" India. These sanctions serve no legitimate purpose, and their imposition is ultimately detrimental to a strong and lasting friendship between the world’s two largest democracies.

In fact, the sanctions are inherently inimical to the very stability and security they seek to promote. As in the U.S., in India too there is a strong public sentiment favouring the maintenance of a minimum level of armed force as a deterrent against aggressors. This can be directly attributed to non-democratic neighbouring states with a history of warring against India, and those countries seeking to undermine India’s democratic and cultural ethos. An America that is understanding of India’s internal constraints and external threats should ensure that other alliances inimical to American interests do not develop and take hold in the region. India is a bulwark against undemocratic and fundamentalist forces in Asia.

The sanctions against India also hurt American economic interests. The U.S. has identified India as among the world’s top ten emerging markets. In important information technology industries, Indian companies now rate among the best in the world, and the U.S. has benefited greatly from Indian expertise. In the coming years, India’s burgeoning middle class and growing prosperity will make it even more attractive to American corporations. American interests lie in engaging and collaborating in all spheres of development in India. The natural alliance that should exist between the world’s largest democracies is being impeded by the sanctions.

Unfortunately, no headway was made in the removal of sanctions. Clinton did not propose to the Congress that they vote on removing the sanctions, and the Congress did not press for it. Seems as if the Indian side knew that pushing for the removal of sanctions would open up the Pandora’s box that is Kashmir. For official purposes, Kashmir was not on the list of "discussion items" during Vajpayee’s visit.

2. Fighting terrorism

In the latest U.S. State Department report, the hub of international terrorism based on an extremist version of Islam has been identified as the Afghan-Pakistan region, an area bordering the north and Northwest part of India. Robert Kaplan, in an article in the September 2000 issue of The Atlantic magazine warns that in this land without borders the graduates of Islamic extremist schools are preparing for a "holy war" not only in Kashmir but all across India, as well as in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Chechnya, and Bosnia. A significant part of the funding for terrorist activities is said to originate from smuggling and trade in narcotics worth billions of dollars. Kaplan believes that Pakistan is on the verge of imploding, and that such an implosion will have reverberations around the world.

While the stated Pakistani objective is to settle the core issue of Kashmir on Islamabad’s terms, the ultimate goal is to dismember India and subsume secular India within a fundamentalist Islamic cauldron. Pakistani sponsorship of insurgencies and terrorism against India dates from 1947. Since 1990, Pakistan has been sending both Pakistani and foreign mercenaries into Kashmir to kill and maim.

The instabilities created in the region, and the lost economic, technological and strategic potential of India needed to be urgently and immediately dealt with by the U.S. It seems that the two sides did spend time dealing with this issue but it is not clear from official statements as to what specific steps the two are going to take to curb terrorism in the region. The U.S. did not declare Pakistan a terrorist state, nor did Vajpayee demand from Clinton that he do so. This was the quid pro quo for the U.S. side not "suggesting" third party involvement in the resolution of the Kashmir crisis. Vajpayee’s address to the joint session of Congress contained some strong language on Pak-sponsored terrorism, and a effective reminder to the assembled Congressmen that terrorism has a way of affecting even those who think they have "terror-proofed" their nation. Unfortunately, there was no joint declaration or document proposing an Indo-U.S. effort at curbing terrorism in the region. May be that was so because Gen. Musharaff was in New York at the Millennium Meet and was haranguing the few who would listen to him about the need for third party intervention in Kashmir, because according to him the situation in Kashmir could be compared to the situation in East Timor.

Musharaff and Pakistan have their own backers in the U.S., including the "venerable" New York Times which, unlike other national newspapers, did not carry one opinion piece calling for stronger Indo-U.S. relations. Pakistan also has entrenched supporters in the U.S. State Department as well as in the U.S. military, and therefore those interests would have effectively scuttled the drafting of an anti-terrorist document.

3. Permanent Seat for India in the U.N. Security Council

Recently a bipartisan group of 65 US Congressmen sent a letter to President Clinton urging him to support India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. They know the potential benefits for the US in supporting India’s claim. Their support has to be seen in the context of the changing world scenario including the terrorist threats from Afghan-Pakistan centred Islamic fundamentalist forces, aggressive designs for regional hegemony by China, and the arming of repressive regimes around the world, including Pakistan, by Beijing.

The US knows that India has played a leading role in the deliberations and activities of the United Nations. Indian troops have been deployed in UN peacekeeping operations in four continents, and they have set a fine example in Asia and Africa, as witnessed by its operations against rebel forces in Sierra Leone. India is also part of the UN standby arrangement making it the single largest troop contributor to the UN.

India’s bid for a Security Council seat has the support already of the UK, France, Russia, Germany, and Japan. Vajpayee, however, was not able to convince Bill Clinton that he should set the ball rolling in this matter. Whether Vajpayee was able to brief Al Gore, probably the next U.S. president, about it was not evident from news reports.

So, what can we conclude from the just concluded visit? I hate to fall into the trap of "clever journalism" but this meeting between the leaders of the most powerful and the most populous democracy came rather late in the day: a lame-duck president meeting with a limping prime minister.

However, there was enough positive symbolism during the visit that one can conclude, without trying to put too much a spin, that this was a constructive visit, and may be even a symbolically successful visit. The positive symbols included

• Vajpayee’s address to the joint session of Congress
• the concern showed by Clinton and Gore to Vajpayee, treating him with respect and decorum
• the recognition of the Indian-American community, a million and a half strong, as a dynamic, vibrant, and visible group
• the large and lavish banquets and official dinners that were well-attended by Hollywood bigwigs and Silicon Valley billionaires
• the gesture of Gore to take time from his hectic campaigning to come meet with Vajpayee and host a lunch
• the rather small and muted protests by Khalistanis and Christian propagandists
• and may be the most important symbol of all, the many opinion pieces from academics and think tank strategists calling for a new and stronger relationship with India.

-- Ramesh N. Rao
Sepetember 20th, 2000

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